We produce the first study to explore the effect of political money contributions on IPO valuation. Drawing evidence from the U.S., we show that both lobbying and PAC expenditure pay off on issue day as donors incur less underpricing, an effect that can be amplified by contribution size and strategic targeting of recipients. Donor IPOs also experience negative offer price revisions and lower aftermarket volatility. Collectively, our results offer new empirical grounding to information asymmetry and bookbuilding theories.
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the results invariably corroborate our main conjecture in this study, the effect is amplified for underwriters with a scarcity of the second (indirect) type of connections. Therefore, PMC issuers are shown to be sought-after in themselves rather than as liaisons between the investment banker and the loci of power.
For a holistic study of the PMC effect, we also trace the aftermarket volatility of IPO equities.
Following a matched sample approach, we assign to each PMC IPO a non-PMC closest neighbor and record the standard deviation of returns on the two portfolios within specific time intervals that extend up to a year after the issue. Invariably, the results prove that PMC shares trade significantly more smoothly than their non-PMC counterparts. In addition, we show that the wider the interval, the more sizeable the difference in mean volatility grows to be. Apparently, the PMC-driven sentiment extends well beyond the IPO event.
We subject findings to a battery of robustness exercises. First, we assess the time sensitivity of our results by introducing alternative cutoffs with regard to PMC distance from the IPO day. Second, in order to disentangle the effect of each contribution type, we rerun our main regressions for lobbying and PAC in isolation. With this testing to yield a qualitatively similar relation, our choice for grouping under a common PMC umbrella is largely warranted. Notably, the least underpriced IPOs have employed some blend of lobbying and PAC contributions. This proves that a PMC effort, in order to fulfill its mission, whether as a means to reduce information asymmetries or a bargaining weapon, needs to be both sizeable and focused; lobbying contributions cater for the size factor by being uncapped, PAC contributions provide the more personalized dimension by entering directly into candidates' campaign coffers. Third, we acknowledge the existence of a special group of PMC IPOs ('political by birth') that commence contributions shortly after foundation. We test separately for these early birds allowing for a possible covariance of the PMC effect with the corporate life cycle. With inadequate evidence to support this conjecture, though, a long apolitical past is shown to pose no threat to the PMC-stemming benefits.
This study makes important contributions to IPO and corporate finance literature while addressing concerns of mounting public interest such as the symbiotic relation between the corporate world and politics.
First, we show how a firm's political donations, commonly associated with remote and indirect benefits, translate into an immediate and measurable gain on the IPO day. With a median expenditure of $ 71.5 thousand, such contributions exert a profound effect on altering the relative dynamics in an IPO sale as both underwriter and market investors factor in a firm's Washington strategy; the former assigns a premium valuation and the latter systematically maintain first-day return at a modest level. Second, we contrast lobbying and PAC spending, as the two main PMC types, and disentangle their effect on IPO performance. Highlighting special strengths and weaknesses for each strategy, we make a case about their complementary nature towards an effective mechanism for combating ex ante uncertainty. Third, differentiating among PAC money recipients by Congress chamber, party affiliation and individual characteristics, we devise an optimal target group for the most constraining effect upon underpricing. The implications for prospective listers are unambiguous: a dollar spent on PMC activity saves many more on the actual listing day. Sure enough, uncertainty-driven underpricing 6 can be fought with alternative tools; for instance, marketing campaigns or charities. In that case, however, the advantage of a well-implemented PMC strategy would be twofold as: (1) it typically entails a dramatically lower investment; and (2) the likely benefits are expected to extend over well beyond the IPO event.
Our study relates to the works of Beatty (1989) , Megginson and Weiss (1991) , Carter et al. (1998) , Certo (2003) , Faccio (2006) , An and Chan (2008) , Francis et al. (2009) , Cooper et al. (2010) , Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) , Yu and Yu (2011) and Correia (2014) . A focal point in the IPO literature has been issuers' effort to overcome moral hazard and adverse selection concerns by signaling quality. In this regard, firms reportedly employ a plethora of means. A nonexhaustive list shows issuers targeting prestige spillovers by: (1) hiring reputable auditors (Beatty, 1989) , (2) inviting VCs with a proven record of successful IPOs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) , (3) employing top-notch underwriters (Carter et al., 1998) , (4) infusing management teams with prestigious executives (Certo, 2003) , and (5) seeking a credit rating (An and Chan, 2008) . Expanding this literature, we produce the first study to relate political donations to IPO performance and introduce PMC as a novel strategy for a prospective lister to claim value with assertiveness. Another strand of literature stemming from the interplay of politics with business (Faccio, 2006; Cooper et al., 2010; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010 Yu and Yu, 2011) draws evidence from firms with several years of experience as public corporations that have developed their connections over a sufficiently large time span. From an alternate perspective, the present study fixates upon the IPO event for highlighting a firm's need to fast-track connections in the pre-IPO period, so that it cashes in benefits as early as the first day of trade.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section I reviews selected studies of IPO and political connections literature. Section II develops our hypotheses. We describe our sample and contrast the two PMC types in Section III. Section IV outlines our methodology. The empirical analysis is in Section V. We test the robustness of our results in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
I. Related Literature

A. Theoretical Framework
Price discovery for new equity offerings is an inherently uncertain process. The relevant literature invariably captures this uncertainty by means of listing day aftermarket performance. Since the seminal works of Stoll and Curley (1970) , Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) have revealed a robust pattern of abnormal positive returns, a plethora of theories attempt to explain the conundrum of IPO first-day return, which is appropriately referred to as underpricing. The asymmetries in information among the various parties involved in an IPO deal serve as a focal point for most explanations offered. For example, Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) maintain that in light of a de facto informational disadvantage, risk-averse investors are naturally inclined to pressure for a discount price. In parallel, effective price discovery requires unbiased feedback from engaged investors and, if possible, their proprietary insight. But since private information comes at a cost, the underwriter is likely to adjust the offer price downwards in order to provide compensation at the issuer's 7 expense (see Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Wilhelm, 1990 and Spatt and Srivastava, 1991) . Accordingly, the need to underprice lies at the intersection of demand-side and bookbuilding factors.
Another strand of literature, also stemming from the asymmetric information framework, assigns value to underpricing and illustrates circumstances under which an issuer would concede to a large first-day return.
Far from the market friction view, Welch (1992), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Demers and Lewellen (2003) regard a reasonably low offer price as an effective marketing tool for appealing to an extended base of uninformed investors. The implicit assumption is that the firm will be able to capitalize in due course on the enhanced attention drawn from a euphoric IPO, recouping more wealth than what was given up at listing. Chemmanur (1993) adds increased analyst coverage to the benefits of a high initial return while a number of studies pertinent to the legal implications of IPOs highlight the lawsuit deterrence effect of a strong first-day close (Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Drake and Vetsuypens, 1993 and Shu, 2002) .
Lastly, Loughran and Ritter (2002) , in a notable turn from asymmetric information to prospect theory, portray underpricing as a rather harmless vice, suggesting that initial investors, already being in a prosperous state through the amassment of IPO proceeds, rarely reckon the marginal utility foregone on the first day of trade. Yet, it is Jay Ritter who estimates on his website the cost of global IPO underpricing to be $135.12 billion. And this only captures the period 1998-2012. Consequently, the astronomical magnitude of the amount fosters skepticism against any behavioral explanations assigning a lesser importance to the efficient pricing process.
B. Political Connections as a Value Adding Strategy
The value adding component of corporate political connections is explored in literature via two main routes; these either involve scrutiny of company insiders' proprietary network or, alternatively, apply a 'followthe-money' approach going after cash flows directed from corporate coffers to politics.
Within an international or cross-country context, poor data availability and, on occasion, deliberately opaque interrelations between the business world and local governments typically leave no option but to directly investigate the individual profiles of corporate officials. In these cases, companies derive their connections through directors and executives who either actively engage in politics or remain closely related to others who do. Faccio (2006) applies this identification method in a comparative study of 47 countries and finds that connected firms are able to sustain larger market shares without this feature to reflect proportionately on the accounting bottom line (see also Boubakri et al., 2008) . The study observes further that connected firms maintain significantly more levered capital structures as they enjoy preferential access to debt financing (e.g. lenient debt covenants), although there is no evidence of incurring a smaller interest expense than their peers. Chaney et al. (2011) assess the reporting quality of more than 4,500 firms in 19 countries and reach the conclusion that politically connected firms are not penalized for consistently underperforming in this field.
Apparently, in light of political reach, accounting data shrinks in value relevance.
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Tracing political connections in the U.S. at the director's level, similarly to the above studies, would likely produce less enlightening results. In the Faccio (2006) database, out of a total of 6,007 U.S. firms examined, only 13 of them qualify to be classified as politically connected. U.S.-centered literature circumvents this limitation by recognizing corporate expenditure for political purposes (overwhelmingly, lobbying and PAC) as a valid proxy for political connections. Notably, within this methodological framework, the particular PMC type appears of minor importance. For example, even though Chen et al. (2010) and Cooper et al. (2010) concentrate on lobbying and PAC contributions, respectively, they draw a common conclusion: donor firms robustly enjoy superior financial and accounting returns. Besides performance, political money has been documented to facilitate more questionable ends. Indicatively, Correia (2014) finds that PMC lower the probability of an SEC enforcement action and, even if the firm is subjected to one, the financial penalty is expected to be very moderate. Yu and Yu (2011) take this argument one step further and stress the immunity to fraud that lobbying can provide. Interestingly, "firms that lobby on average have a significantly lower hazard rate of being detected for fraud, evade fraud detection 117 days longer, and are 38% less likely to be detected by regulators."
C. Political Connections in the Going-Public Process
Recent studies on China show that political connections can play a decisive role towards a successful IPO. Fan et al. (2007) , drawing evidence from the (partial) privatizations of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), attest to the contained underpricing that these firms incur when headed by incumbent or past government officials. Corroborating this research, Francis et al. (2009) discuss the threefold benefit that a strong association with the government entails by supporting premium valuations, imposing discipline on firstday returns and reducing costs throughout the entire issuance process. Yet, the distinct character of the Chinese capital markets casts doubt on the applicability of this insight into a cross-country framework. More importantly, these connections, largely an inheritance from the past economic model, entail no cost and, therefore, may not be considered as an issuer's political strategy. Resorting to the international privatization literature, the studies of Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) and Perroti and Guney (1993) meet on the excessive underpricing of SOEs compared to non-SOE IPOs, a finding that is challenged in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) . But again, any inferences to be drawn from SOEs to the typical corporate issuer remain, at best, dubious as the ex ante uncertainty is fundamentally different when the state is a counterparty. In a U.S. setting, Ritter and Welch (2002) , within a line that has surprisingly escaped attention, raise the speculation that underwriters employ the allocation of (discounted) IPO shares as a tool for influencing politicians. Logically, the alignment of incentives should fundamentally be revised when the issuer, rather than standing between the investment banker and the sought-after connections, assists in bridging the distance. We develop this proposition in the next section.
II. Hypotheses Development
Political connections formed via PMC, whether the firm operates in a private or public domain, remain in essence a long-lived intangible asset and may hardly be framed as preparation for an imminent offering.
Even so, a precedent of donations can profoundly alter the relative dynamics in an IPO sale. To uncover the incremental value accruing to a firm soliciting equity capital 'connected,' we rely upon two non-mutually exclusive lines of argument.
First, if, as per Logue (1977) , IPO pricing mirrors an issuer's bargaining power vis-à-vis lead underwriter, a valuable deal for the former party is likely to emerge once it convincingly transmits less dependence upon the latter agent's resources. A PMC setting is in line with this spirit as: (1) the de facto esteem of connected firms simplifies the marketing effort and generally appears to be more compatible with the types of offerings that enhance an underwriter's reputational capital, rather than those relying on it for certification (as in Carter and Manaster, 1990) ; (2) the preferential access to alternative means of financing (Faccio, 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008 and Houston et al., 2014) allows for the possibility of either waiting until a satisfactory negotiated outcome arises or cancelling the deal altogether; and (3) the rent-extracting capacity attributable to connections (Hart, 2001; Faccio, 2006 and Cooper et al., 2010) reinforces expectations of a recurring business relationship with the underwriter, as in the case of follow-on offerings, M&A activity and trading revenue for the brokerage arm. A more subtle point can be deduced not as a result of the PMC act per se, but on the basis of management's determination to pursue one additional resource: PMC-stemming benefits. Arguably, an issuer identifying with the minority of firms that challenge the boundaries of the prevailing institutional environment and go after policymakers is also less likely to concede to a lowballing of the IPO price.
Second, PMC reduce information asymmetries for principal participants involved in the listing process.
A more level playing field is attainable: (1) within a niche network of similarly politically connected people or entities. Institutional investors, without precluding other economic agents (underwriter, retail investors, financial and legal intermediaries etc.), can be central to such an association by virtue of an advanced sophistication level. In this respect, political connections shape for the IPO firm an additional channel through which it can exchange inside information for projections of demand and overall market sentiment; (2) due to the disclosure element entailing both the filing of lobbying reports and the identification of PAC recipients.
Logically, reassessing an issuer's risk exposure in conjunction with all remedial action taken in the form of PMC alleviates an important portion of ex ante uncertainty. Let one of our opening examples, Facebook, illustrate further this notion. With intellectual property infringement posing as a primary threat, operational viability remains conditional on the protection of proprietary rights. Indeed, the firm's IPO prospectus (S-1 document), among other risk factors, declares: "If we are unable to protect our intellectual property, the value of our brand and other intangible assets may be diminished, and our business may be adversely affected." Yet, an investigation of the company's PMC activity is likely to mitigate related concerns divulging a substantial 10 and ongoing lobbying effort on issues of copyright, patent and domain name protection, a campaign that was also complemented by PAC contributions towards the leadership of the relevant Congressional committees 5 .
Notwithstanding the multifaceted role that a PMC record can obtain in the elimination of asymmetries, Ritter and Welch (2002) recognize that "all theories of underpricing based on asymmetric information share the prediction that underpricing is positively related to the degree of asymmetric information."
In sum, the potential channels lend support to PMC as a means of imposing discipline on first-day returns and lead to our main hypothesis: Grier and Munger, 1993) . Given the above, we expect additional prestige to accrue to firms contributing preferentially to Senate candidates and the merits of being associated with the more privileged Congress chamber should reflect on IPO return.
H.2.a. Underpricing decreases more with PAC contributions to Senate rather than House candidates.
Disentangling the effect of PAC contributions across political party lines is a more complex task. The relevant studies highlight firms' strategy to target incumbents, irrespectively of party affiliation, and converge to the conclusion that firms spend to ensure access rather than to influence the outcome of elections or for other ideological reasons (Stigler, 1971; Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and Milyo et al., 2000) . Lowery and Brasher (2004: 133) describe this phenomenon in an accurate manner: "most of the economic sectors do not put all of 5 The election cycle 2010-2011 saw substantial PMC activity for Facebook Inc. In detail, lobbying expenditure reached $ 1,701,390 and total PAC contributions $ 270,000. Among PAC recipients we note Bob Goodlatte ($ 2,000) and Mel Watt ($ 2,000) as the chairman and ranking member, respectively, of the Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet committee of the House of Representatives. In the Senate, PAC recipients include John Kerry ($ 2,500) and Jim DeMint ($ 2,500) as the chairman and ranking member, respectively, of the Communications, Technology and the Internet committee. 6 Lobbying, because of its impersonal nature, does not allow for any further differentiation other than the monetary intensity of the contribution.
Commented [U36]:
As a verb, this should be 'advise' … their eggs in one partisan basket. They give to both parties; or, more specifically they give to incumbents, which means that they give to both parties,"
Because of corporate donors' indifference, literature has turned its attention to the partisan preferences of market investors. In this respect, some early insight from Niederhoffer et al. (1970) and Riley and Luksetich (1980) associates a bullish market with the aftermath of Republican victories. At the firm level the evidence is rather mixed. Goldman et al. (2009) , tracing corporate political contributions from the 2000 election cycle,
refute altogether an association of the outcome of the elections with post-election market returns. In contrast, Shon (2010) , also using data from the turbulent period of the 2000 Florida recount, documents a significant relation between campaign donations and stock prices. With a broader time window, Cooper et al. (2010) conclude that PAC contributions have a strong positive relation with both market and accounting measures of performance, documenting an incremental contribution effect for Democrats.
Overall, we hypothesize that a recipient candidate's partisan camp is likely to produce a differential effect on the IPO process. Considering the substantial discord in literature, however, we can hardly predict the winner's side in an unbiased manner. Thus, while leaving the direction of the relation up to empirical investigation, we note that contrary to the popular notion, Republicans may plausibly deviate from the 'probusiness' party stereotype.
H.2.b. Underpricing significantly relates to the partisan identity of candidates receiving PAC contributions.
Down to the level of individual characteristics, each candidate comprises a unique portfolio of attributes. Among them, we attach special weight to: (1) geographic scope, (2) an uninterrupted relationship with the firm, and (3) a track record of leadership while in Congress. Faccio and Parsley (2009) , in a provocative manner of pinpointing the interdependent relations between businesses and local authorities, document a decrease in share price for firms headquartered in a politician's hometown upon the announcement of her unexpected death. Within a U.S. context, Roberts (1990) had already witnessed a similar effect for Washington-based companies following the loss of Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson in September of 1983. In assessing the value of connections, therefore, we need to acknowledge the symbiotic relationship among the local pillars of power, especially for those firms maintaining an extended operational base in the headquarters' state. Additionally, literature favors constant streams of PAC money, as opposed to one-off or sporadic spending (Strattman, 1995 , 1998 and Krozner and Strattman, 1998 Lobbying is the prevalent means, in terms of both frequency and size, by which U.S. companies interfere in the making of politics (de Figueredo and Richter, 2014) . Dollar contributions made to this end (publicly disclosed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995) aim to advance a firm's perspective of the institutional framework within which it operates. Consequently, rather than being directed at specific politicians, lobbying pertains to the essence of the legislative process. Of course, the fact that no money enters candidates' campaign coffers hampers the traceability of cash flows to the individual recipient level. For example, the relevant document acknowledging a contribution succinctly mentions that a firm lobbied the "U.S. Hanley, 1993 and . However, as we show in later sections, it primarily attests to the initial overvaluation of donor IPOs and the resulting need for correction, a phenomenon idiosyncratic to the PMC setting. Notably, it is within the PMC sample, exclusively, where the mean value of revisions (-2%) assumes a negative sign. In passing, the mean differences in returns and revisions come out significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Panel B analyzes all IPO characteristics to be used as control variables in the subsequent regressions.
On a comparative basis, PMC firms are considerably larger than their non-PMC counterparts as demonstrated by the average gross proceeds raised: $ 354 million for the former and $ 92 million for the latter IPOs. They also deliver superior profitability (captured by an earnings per share dummy) and rely less on leverage. In addition to stronger fundamentals, PMC firms possess more years of operational experience with a mean age approximating 25 years; that is about 10 years older than the average of the non-contributing sample.
Consistent with the overall quality image, PMC IPOs are less likely to resort to venture capital financing and For communicating the essence of contributions in a visual way, we refer the reader to Panel A of Table   3 , i.e. top-fifteen IPOs ranked by PMC intensity. Overall, the first-day returns of these PMC heavyweights are dwarfed by annual average IPO returns in all but three cases (Talecris Biotherapeutics, SAIC and Mastercard).
In a striking example, the second largest contributor, PentaStar Communications, documents a return of 7.5% 
IV. Methodology
A. PMC Choice & PMC Level
To fully capture the effect of PMC on underpricing we distinguish between a firm's choice to engage in PMC and cash flow recorded towards this purpose. In doing so, we cater for our reluctance to assign an a priori linear relation between PMC size and dollars left on the table. Indeed, a meticulous study on the nature of lobbying and PAC contributions reveals reasons or circumstances under which the intensity of contribution weighs less than the PMC act per se.
According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), a lobbying contact is any oral or written communication (inclusive of electronic interactions) to an executive branch official or a legislative branch official that is made on behalf of a client with regard to the formulation, modification or adoption of federal laws, executive orders or government contracts, etc. Conceivably, once lobbying is framed as a communication endeavor, monetary intensity also becomes contingent to the intrinsic characteristics of the message it is meant to convey. For instance, evidence (as in Leech et al., 2005; Bonardi and Keim 2005 and Baumgartner et al., 2011) shows that messages of a salient or relevant nature consume more lobbying resources. And this is by no means conditional on outcome.
PAC contributions, in spite of an unambiguous mission (i.e. fundraising vehicle for a candidate's campaign), pose two main challenges. First, the FEC-imposed $ 10 thousand ceiling 9 on corporate contributions allows for minimal support for any particular candidate. To put this amount in perspective, 2012 data from Vital Statistics on Congress estimate the cost of winning a seat in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives at $ 10.3 million and $ 1.6 million, respectively. More scope for differentiation can arise from the assembly of a portfolio of candidates; yet, this brings about a second challenge. Specifically, committee memberships, rankings, incumbency (as well as length of) and majority party alignment are all features that distribute unequally the agenda-setting power among elected officials (as in Cooper et al., 2010) so that the number of sponsored candidates hardly adds up to a firm's overall sphere of influence.
Given the above, the next section engages the full sample in order to assess the effect of PMC involvement on first-day return. Subsequently, we focus on the cash flow level and, drawing evidence from the PMC sample, we gauge the incremental effect on underpricing per PMC dollar spent.
Β. Estimation Methods
To relate PMC involvement to IPO pricing, we specify a treatment effects model as follows:
( 1) where Xi encompasses a vector of firm-and IPO-specific characteristics, PMC enters the model as a dichotomous variable, and εi stands for the residual term. Further, letting Z be a set of measurable determinants of PMC, we can define accordingly the selection equation as:
( 2) A greater degree of complication resides within the estimation approach as we can barely lend support to the stochastic independence of the variable in interest. Firms that place the legislative framework among their key operational risks are inclined to self-select themselves into the PMC practice. In addition, unobservable determinants of PMC such as a firm's extant political network and overall exposure to the institutional environment are also susceptible to influence pricing. We therefore expect these elements to enter equations 1 and 2, through ε and η, respectively, giving rise to feedback effects. Heckman (1979) proves how this selection bias cripples the reliability of OLS estimates and, ultimately, comes down to an omitted variables problem. In a setting that diverges from Heckman (1979) only in that the outcome equation regressand (underpricing) assumes a value for every observation (IPO) in the sample, we can similarly apply the proposed two-stage procedure to account for the bias. Within a corporate finance context, among others, Cohen (2003) resorts to the aforementioned method to treat the endogenous nature of the binary regressor of financial reporting quality, and so do An and Chan (2008) for a firm's decision to obtain a credit rating before an IPO.
Econometrically, we can make a case for the need for selectivity correction by rewriting equations (1) and (2) in an augmented model as shown below:
Respectively, the model for the non-PMC IPO becomes:
[
Subtracting equation (4) from (3), we derive the incremental expectation due to PMC:
where Φ and ϕ refer to the cumulative and density distribution function, in this order, of the standard normal distribution.
Modeled as such, the incremental expectation coincides with the OLS estimate of (γ), which distorts the actual effect on underpricing to a direction determined by the sign of the terms in equation (5) Making a stronger assumption about the bivariate normality of the residual terms in equations 1 and 2, we estimate the system simultaneously. Because it processes all available information at once, FIML is a more efficient estimation technique than the two-stage procedure described above (Nelson, 1984) . In addition, the FIML estimates allow us to test the null hypothesis of residual terms independence by means of the Wald test.
Finally, we relax the assumption of the normal distribution of the residuals and thus challenge the validity of our results outside the Heckman framework. This is attainable with an instrumental variables (IV) approach (see Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 5) , which instruments for PMC, in Equation 1, via ω. The use of fitted probabilities as an instrument implies that the probit model can assume a suboptimal specification with minor effect on the IV estimates. This robustness property of the IV approach allows for flexibility in the selection of explanatory variables, a vital feature considering the substantial discord in literature about the exact PMC determinants. Incidentally, the IV setting is opportune for the Hausman test, which we conduct as an additional endogeneity control.
V. Empirical Results
Α. Determinants of PMC Activity
In this subsection, we investigate a battery of plausible incentives for political donations and report the results in Table 6 . The estimation techniques previously discussed converge to a probit regression in order to model a firm's likelihood to resort to PMC. Although interesting in its own right, this regression, once augmented by IPO literature covariates, comprises the first stage of both the Heckman and the instrumental variables methods. As such, it is critical to satisfy the exclusion restriction via a regressor influencing the PMC decision but not IPO underpricing. To this end, we employ the variable Bills introduced referring to those ideas for legislation which have received adequate support to become a bill. Indeed, while it is unlikely that this factor affects first-day returns, firms' incentives for PMC should increase with a longer agenda of issues brought before Congress. From the side of incumbent officials, a heavier workload reasonably consumes more resources either as inputs into the legislative process (i.e. lobbying) or in the effort to reconcile the policy making consequences with the chances for reelection (i.e. PAC), so that the demand for contributions appears also larger. For a systematic study, we classify PMC determinants into four general categories: i) firm profile & visibility, ii) internal politics, iii) political exposure, and iv) operational complexity. This specification yields a pseudo-R 2 of 23.3%.
Α.1. Firm Profile & Visibility
As evidenced in the descriptive statistics, PMC activity flourishes with a bigger corporate footprint. Masters and Keim (1985) illustrate how asset intensity reinforces a firm's ability to exert scrutiny over its benefits earned by PMC as accruing to firms in proportion to their size. As for the cost, larger establishments can opportunely spread it over a wider asset base. In a similar vein, a hefty level of cash flow proxies for resource availability. Masters and Keim (1985) make a case about the propensity of cash-affluent firms to contribute more, maintaining, nonetheless, an interesting reservation: successful firms may strategically abstain from political action in order to avoid unwanted public attention; this is particularly true for those firms that resemble monopolies and are capable of extracting rents as such. Firm age is a controversial variable in the sense that older firms are more likely to have invested in ties to politics and to nurture them via PMC on an ongoing basis. On the flip side, Hart (2001) upholds that their younger rivals may engage in aggressive contributions pursuing a quick fix to a perceived deficiency in political reach. However, this syndrome of making up for lost time is likely to blur their vision with regard to the value relevance of PMC investment.
Finally, we include media coverage. Given the disclosure scarcity of the pre-IPO environment, media attention can magnify a firm's dependence on institutional environment and sketch out possible risks, above and beyond a typical 'Risk Factors' section on the S-1 form. Within this context, PMC dollars can act as a sweetener to public concerns and infuse forward-looking predictions with renewed optimism.
The probit results confirm that large and cash-affluent firms are more likely to engage in PMC. Further, media coverage obtains a positive and highly significant coefficient (at the 1% level), corroborating our last conjecture. In contrast, firm age comes out as a poor PMC determinant in the IPO setting.
Α.2. Internal Politics
Theorists have indicated a plethora of organizational aspects that are directly influenced by management's political standpoint. For example, Chin et al. (2013) evidence that U.S. firms with liberal (conservative) CEOs, in the aftermath of subpar financial performance, sustain (limit) corporate social responsibility initiatives. Extending this research to political donations, they find that the more liberal the topechelon executives appear, the more PMC spending aligns with Democratic purposes. More often than not, however, ideological or partisan preferences of management and other stakeholders, also driven by individual ambition, exist in a state of conflict and compete fiercely over the available PMC budget (for example, Hart, 2001 ). Thus, to the extent that contributions represent a form of perquisite consumption, organizational politics plays a decisive role in shaping a firm's PMC behavior. We allow this dimension to enter the probit model through the inclusion of the pre-IPO management ownership and the percentage of unionized employees in the firm's industry. Additionally, given the multifaceted influence that a venture capital (VC) firm exerts on a prospective lister (e.g. from the appointment of directors to IPO time selection), we account accordingly for its presence by means of a dummy variable. Predicting, however, the direction of this relationship entails considerable uncertainty as the cues stemming from the grandstanding theory are mixed (Gompers, 1996) . It may be the case that younger VCs, anxious about gaining prestige, attach value to PMC as a time-and-cost-20 efficient tool for promoting an image of connectedness. On the other hand, because they tend to myopically fixate on the IPO day, VCs are incentivized to exert frugality as the PMC benefits can appear remote and incompatible with a short-term investment horizon.
The estimate of the probit coefficient shows that the PMC probability increases with management's equity stake at all conventional levels of significance. It also increases with the participation of venture capital (at the 10% level of significance). Given VCs' anchoring on listing time, we pay particular attention to this finding. Evidently, VCs recognize at least some short-term benefits in PMC, thereby aligning with our main conjecture in this study. In contrast, the percentage of unionized employees in the firm's industry obtains an insignificant coefficient.
Α.3. Political Exposure
A firm's special competitive and geographic environment naturally claims significant explanatory power over the PMC decision. At the industry level, Zardkoohi (1985) acknowledges two possibilities:
bourgeoning PMC participation may inspire firms to align efforts for benefits accruing to the industry as a whole or, alternatively, give rise to free riders as a public good. Interestingly, while these variables are among the well-established PMC determinants (e.g. Cooper et al., 2010 and Skaife et al., 2013) , in the IPO paradigm, we can only make a robust case (at the 1% level of significance) about our instrument (i.e. Bills introduced) and Industry PMC. Moreover, the positive association of the latter variable with PMC involvement favors the coalition over the free-ridership scenario. In passing, the coefficients on HHI and the Electoral College fail all conventional levels of significance.
Α.4. Operational Complexity
Hart (2001) highlights salient implications for the role of R&D as a proxy for asset specificity; he posits that the more specific a firm's operations appear, the less power an exit threat obtains as a means of exercising pressure on policymakers. Under this framework, there should also be a positive relation between R&D and PMC involvement. We investigate this possibility by identifying via a dummy variable (R&D) those IPOs disclosing an R&D expenditure. PMC incentives due to complication can also arise from a rigid regulatory framework. We similarly use a dummy variable (Regulated industry) for regulated IPOs. As such, we designate issuers with SIC codes of 4900-4939 (electric and gas), 1300 (oil and gas extraction), 4000-4700 (transportation), 4800 (telecommunications), 4950-4959 (sanitary services) and 6000-6712 (financial companies). Especially for those sectors in the economy experiencing government as both a regulator and buyer, the resource dependence theory predicts increased chances of contributions towards the key decision loci. We capture this dual role of government by means of a dummy variable (Government purchases) set to 1 for the five sectors topping the Economic Census list of U.S. public spending (i.e. defense, health, energy, transportation and education). As a last dimension to operational complexity, we take the number of a firm's business and geographic segments. Diversification at any of these levels induces contributions as at least some segments are likely to reap the benefits; this expectation causes a risk-averse management to view PMC as a somewhat safer bet (also as per Zardkoohi, 1985) .
The results strongly suggest an increased PMC likelihood in the presence of escalating operational complexity. Specifically, R&D expenditure, regulated industry, government purchases and business segments all obtain positive coefficients, significant at the 5% level or better. The geographic segments make up an interesting deviation with a coefficient that is both negative and insignificant. We surmise that with greater geographic reach a firm becomes capable of leveraging its exposure to different legislative frameworks and campaign financing needs so that the PMC decision obtains a highly contextual character. Firm age set equal to the number of years elapsing from a firm's foundation to IPO. Previous literature commonly employs age as a surrogate for risk (Ritter, 1984 (Ritter, , 1991 Schultz, 1993 and Carter et al., 1998 hypothesis, refute the long-term horizon of VCs. Instead, they describe a sense of urgency so that the latter release funds towards the next IPO targets. Of course, a premature IPO is an opportune setting for heavy underpricing. We leave the actual direction of the relationship up to empirical investigation.
B. The Effect of PMC on IPO Underpricing
IPO proceeds. We use this item as a proxy for size. Increased visibility inevitably causes larger companies to leave a proportionately bigger footprint within the investor community. Therefore, the latter can relate with more clarity to the firm so that issuer-specific uncertainty diminishes.
Earnings per share (EPS) is taken as a dichotomous variable in order to capture issuers with a positive bottom line in the year trailing the IPO. Firms attaining a sizeable accounting return should be associated with less uncertainty, and thus lower first-day returns. At the same time, profitability, in the pre-IPO period, comes second to presenting a convincing vision for sustainable profitability in the post-IPO period. In one extreme illustration, Trueman et al. (2000) find that in the realm of Internet stocks, nonfinancial measures of performance, such as the number of unique visitors and page views, dominate net income in value relevance.
Consequently, we maintain mixed expectations about the sign of the EPS coefficient.
Leverage. We estimate this ratio as pre-IPO total liabilities over pre-IPO total assets. A reasonably high level of leverage is expected to impose discipline on management consistent with the mechanisms described in Jensen (1986) . Ceteris paribus, we expect firms relying heavily on debt financing to leave less money on the Industry controls enter our model by means of indicator variables for technology and Internet firms to account for the excessive underpricing that these IPOs typically entail (e.g. Aggarwal, 2002) . In addition, we control for the exchange by means of a NASDAQ dummy for being the preferred marketplace for the majority of IPOs.
Underwriter rank pertains to the perceived quality of the agent underwriting the issue. Carter and Manaster (1990) evidence significant underpricing by firms engaging prestigious underwriters and interpret it as a means to signal quality (conceivably only strong issuers are capable of assuming this cost). Arguably, an established underwriter would not risk impairing his reputational capital by facilitating an offering of dubious quality.
Share overhang, defined as the ratio of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders to the total equity given up in IPO (refer also to Bradley and Jordan, 2002) , reflects the natural dilution caused by the issuance. This cost is incurred proportionately by all shareholders retaining equity post-offering. As a result, with a large number of new shares (low overhang ratio) the losses escalate, making incentives to underprice less compelling.
Market return is estimated as the average return realized on the value-weighted CRSP index over the 20 trading days preceding the offering. It is a measure of the overall market sentiment prevailing at the time of the IPO, and as per previous research (Logue, 1973; Hanley, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Derrien and Womack, 2003; Schwert, 2004 and Derrien, 2005) , it is expected to positively associate with IPO return.
Revisions refer to the change of the IPO offer price from the midpoint of the initial filing price range and are a product of all public and private information that becomes available to the underwriter by the time of listing. As a complementary pricing metric, we are equally interested in its cross section with PMC and use it as an outcome variable in subsequent investigation. At the same time, one could draw from Hanley (1993) and the partial price adjustment theory to advocate its inclusion on the right-hand side of the first-day return equation.
To address possible omitted variables concerns, we employ this additional covariate as a robustness exercise in Column 5.
Overall, the three estimation methods in Columns 2, 3 and 4 yield highly significant (at the 1% level)
coefficients on the PMC variable and confirm the predicted negative sign. Further, the resulting coefficient magnitudes are notably consistent with each other. They also sharply contrast the OLS benchmark, in Column 1, which even though attests to the negative relation (at the 5% level), it comes out less than a fourth of the other estimates. Augmenting the baseline specification to account for revisions, in Column 5, confirms the incremental explanatory power of this covariate, yet the effect of PMC remains intact 10 . In sum, though we may not completely rule out alternative interpretations of the negative association between PMC involvement and IPO underpricing, the results accord with our twofold conjecture that PMC level off the informational playing field and confer increased bargaining power.
The findings pertaining to the control variables are interesting in their own right. We obtain a positive and highly significant coefficient on proceeds raised while presumably size should lead to less, rather than more, underpricing; this may hint at the need to attract more uninformed investors via a discount. The coefficient on age (significant and negative) corroborates previous research showing long-lived companies to be associated with more chances of survivorship, and thus less uncertainty. Consistent with Bradley and Jordan (2002) , we attain a significantly positive coefficient on share overhang; dilution costs are greater in issues with lower overhang suggesting a lower underpricing and vice versa. In contrast, underpricing significantly increases with Internet and technology stocks as per Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) . This explanation may naturally extend to the coefficient (likewise positive and significant) on NASDAQ for being the preferred listing platform for technology issuers. Expectedly, the coefficient on the dotcom period is positive and highly significant, evidencing the excessive funds that were left on the table in the bullish period of 1999-2000. The fact that the overall market sentiment reflects on initial returns is also captured by the coefficient on market return (positive and significant at all levels). The positive and significant values on venture capital and 10 The 1% threshold of statistical significance for the PMC coefficient is marginally missed. We reiterate the Heckman and MLE estimations, including the revisions variable, and attain the 1% level of significance for both methods. For simplicity, we report in Column 5 the most conservative estimate, only. To establish the endogenous nature of PMC, we look for separate evidence in each estimation method employed. First, the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio exhibits high statistical significance (p=1%), lending support to our initial suspicion about firms' self-selection into the PMC practice. Second, the Wald test, involving the maximum likelihood estimators, attests to the correlation of the residual terms in the selection and outcome equations at the 1% level. Third, the Hausman test, from an instrumental variables framework, strongly indicates the presence of feedback effects (p=5%). Evidently, latent determinants of the PMC decision are also impounded into first-day returns. Taken together, these findings are in line with the rejection of the null hypothesis of no endogeneity.
In Table 8 , we focus on the PMC sample (N=273) in order to assess the effect of PMC (dollar) level, rather than simple PMC involvement, on underpricing. Including the same covariates as previously, we now use as variables of interest: (1) political money (Specification 1) to capture any combination of lobbying and PAC contributions; (2) lobby money (Specification 2) to concentrate on all lobbying IPOs; and (3) PAC money (Specification 3) to account for all PAC IPOs. Invariably, the resulting coefficients on these variables attain significance, at all conventional levels, while maintaining their negative sign. Consequently PMC, far from representing a nominal value proxy of 'connectedness' or a good faith gesture (in the case of PAC), proves its definite investment character with an incremental effect on underpricing for each dollar disbursed. Further, the coefficient magnitudes are non-negligible. All else being equal, a modest 10% increase in PMC spending accounts for a 2.5% reduction in underpricing. The practical implications from this relationship are important.
Given the median contribution size of $ 71.5 thousand, issuers can rely on PMC as a cost-effective option for combating ex ante uncertainty and positioning themselves in pole position in the negotiations with the underwriter. Thus, our results come up not only statistically but also highly economically significant.
C. The Efficient PAC Plan & Strategic Targeting for Less Money Left on the Table
With PAC contributions being an indispensable element of a well-organized PMC effort, we now explore the type of candidate that market investors want issuers to connect to. Hypothesis 2 frames candidates' overall appeal in terms of contextual as well as idiosyncratic characteristics. We test for the effect of both categories on first-day return in 1) The first index, PI STRENGTH , is expressed as follows:
where Candidatejt,t−5 is a binary variable assuming the value of 1 if the firm has raised PAC money in support of candidate j over the period t−5 to t; Ijt is a binary variable set to 1 if candidate j has been an incumbent at time t, and 0 otherwise; NCVjt is the number of votes that candidate j's party holds in office at time t; NOVjt is the number of votes that candidate j's opposing party holds in office at time t; and rellengthjt,t-5 is the number of months that the relationship between firm i and candidate j spans assuming uninterrupted PAC contributions until time t.
2) The second index, PI POWER , is defined as follows: where Committee rankmt is the reciprocal of candidate j's rank on committee m; Median committee rankmt is the median number of members on a given committee m of which candidate j is a member; and the rest of the variables are defined as above.
3) The third index, PI ABILITY , is expressed as follows:
where HomeCandidatejt,t−5 is a binary variable set to 1 for contributions supporting candidacies from the state of a firm's headquarters, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined as above.
We present the results of this last set of regressions in Specifications (5), (6) and (7). The coefficient signs are invariably negative with PI STRENGTH and PI POWER attaining statistical significance at the 1% level, whereas PI ABILITY is significant at the 10% level. Accordingly, the candidate characteristics that we have assumed to instill confidence in the prospects of a new public firm are valid: (1) veteran Congress members with a proven record of career progression and (2) local politicians, to a lesser extent, are conducive to maintaining first-day returns within range. Intuitive as this relation appears, we note that a firm's political capital is subject to all challenges residing in intangible assets valuation (e.g. lack of measurement scale or absence of control over future benefits). In this respect, connections have to overcome intrinsic uncertainty also pertinent to their relative strength, power and ability, as defined above, before they claim any positive spillovers to issuer-related uncertainty. To this end, candidates scoring highly in the three indexes merit priority in PAC funds appropriation for posing as more value-increasing targets compared to other colleagues in Congress or new challengers.
D. A Closer Look at the Causes of the Limited Underpricing of PMC IPOs
Acknowledging the multifaceted influence that a PMC strategy can exert on an IPO sale, we seek seperate evidence in support of its appeal to market investors and lead underwriter.
D.1. Volatility Behavior of PMC and Matched non-PMC IPOs beyond the Listing day
Could an extant PMC record impose discipline on subsequent returns realized on PMC shares in the same manner that it does on first-day returns? If so, PMC IPOs can be plausibly less underpriced because of fewer concerns among investors relating to liquidity or the level at which a politically connected stock will trade. To explore this enquiry, we follow a matched-sample approach, assigning to each PMC IPO a non-PMC counterpart of the same listing year and 2-digit SIC code. These criteria bring about the elimination of 72 IPOs or, approximately, 25% of the PMC sample. From the resulting matches, we further filter for proceeds raised The variable of interest, volatility, is taken as the standard deviation of daily returns realized within a short time frame subsequent to floatation (similar to Ritter, 1984) . We set this interval to 60 days and report the statistics in Table 10 . To account for a probable roller coaster course of share prices within the first few trades, we allow for 7 trading days to elapse and start recording returns at day 8. For robustness purposes, we reiterate this analysis using the intervals of 120 and 365 days. In all cases, the PMC securities entail significantly lower (at the 1% level) volatility than their matched counterparts. Indicatively, over the 60-day horizon, the mean volatility of the PMC IPOs (3.1%) is 18% lower than that of non-PMC IPOs. The difference is accentuated by the number of days elapsing: PMC IPOs are 21% and 31% less volatile when measured over the 120 and 365 days, respectively. Notably, while the standard deviation of volatility remains constant across time for the PMC IPOs (at 1.3% to 1.4%), it increases in excess of 50% across the periods for the non-PMC IPOs, so that the matched sample yields a standard deviation as high as 6.9% over 365 days. Overall, the aftermarket evidence suggests considerably less discord on the value of PMC shares.
D.2. Bookbuilding for PMC Equities & Underwriters' Own Political Ties
To complement our buy-side findings, we now bring to the forefront the role of the underwriter and see whether we can meet again at an underpricing containment conclusion. To this end, we rely on two sets of tests.
First, we draw evidence from the price discovery process. A smooth ride of PMC equities on the first day of trade, and beyond, invites debate as to whether it reflects the outcome of an equally smooth bookbuilding period or a hard-fought balance among powerful participants. To the extent that political connections can facilitate information flow, they are expected to obviate, to a significant degree, the need for residual information production and subsequent interventions in pricing (as per Spindt, 1989 and Hanley, 1993) . Alternatively, in line with the bargaining power argument, political connections are a notion potent enough to constitute the underwriter more conceding to management's value claims. There is, thus, increased likelihood of the investment banker producing an initial price range inflated by an implicit PMC premium and soliciting investor bids from a high stating point.
Relevant studies consistently operationalize bookbuilding turbulence in terms of the offer price deviation from the midpoint of the initial filing price range (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Spatt and Srivastava, 1991; Hanley, 1993; Goldreich, 2001 and . Because of its comprehensive nature, we expect this metric to lend itself equally well in describing bookbuilding under a PMC regime. We explore this cross-section in Table 11 . All covariates of the earlier specifications retain their place in the new regressions as pricing for bookbuilding participants and aftermarket investors is driven by the same firm-and IPO-specific characteristics (refer for a proof to Lowry and Schwert, 2004) . We thus leave the Due to the endogeneity concerns previously discussed 11 , Columns 1 and 2 present the instrumental variables estimates of the model with the dependent variables to be absolute filing price revisions (Absolute revisions) and filing price revisions (Revisions), respectively. Investigating the magnitude of revisions vis-à-vis their sign reveals a distinct pricing pattern for connected equities. In particular, the insignificant coefficient on PMC in Column 1 indicates that connected equities are generally not any easier to value than other IPOs. As shown in Column 2, however, the average revision in the PMC regime comprises a sizeable (13%) downward adjustment; a finding which fulfills all conventional levels of statistical significance. Therefore, the monotonically negative effect lends support to issuers' bargaining power for attaining an initial valuation that is ultimately proven overoptimistic. At the same time, this also suggests an informational disadvantage from the perspective of the underwriter which casts doubt on the networking effect of PMC.
Second, we consider the possibility that the underwriter is also connected. If underwriters with no traceable links to politics perceive clients' connections as substitutes, they are incentivized to exert more effort towards retaining connected issuers. Consequently, this subsample could introduce bias and overstate the overall PMC effect. To investigate for a differential pricing behavior, we collect further data on the lead underwriter's political expenditure in an approach identical to that for PMC issuers. Therefore, our baseline model is augmented by the interaction of PMC with an unconnected dummy variable (Column 3). In an alternative definition, whereby connectedness arises indirectly through a PMC clientele, the unconnected dummy is set to 1 for underwriters facilitating no more than 1 PMC IPO in any given year (Column 4).
Two conclusions can be drawn from the resulting estimates. First, with the PMC coefficient maintaining the negative sign (at the 5% level of significance) across both specifications, an IPO firm can expect to benefit from a political strategy regardless of the chosen underwriter; issuer's and investment banker's PMC do not cancel each other out. Second, with the interaction term exhibiting statistical significance (at the 5% level) for indirectly connected underwriters only, we show that attracting PMC IPOs comprises an end in itself as opposed to a means for establishing ties to politicians. This finding is in accord with evidence from Houston et al. (2014) showing lower spreads on connected firms' loans as a result of their perceived creditworthiness rather than a banker's attempt to cajole the borrower's network.
Overall, a PMC record can alter the relative dynamics in an IPO sale. In particular, it constitutes the investment banker more conceding at a time when the issuer comes at it strongest. This setting comprises an
alternative, yet complementary, explanation for the moderate underpricing of PMC IPOs.
11 In a methodologically similar manner to the first-day return equation of Table 7 , we conduct the Hausman test and reject the null of no endogeneity. Although these statistics are not reported in Table 11 , in the interest of clarity, they are available from the authors upon request.
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VI. Additional Robustness Tests
A. Sensitivity Analysis
Our main concern about the validity of results is twofold, pertaining to the time and type of PMC. In this section, we adopt a sensitivity analysis framework allowing for both of these dimensions to vary. To facilitate comparison, Panel A of Table 12 recaps the instrumental variable estimates γ₁ and γ₂ for the effect of PMC on initial return and filing price revisions, respectively.
With regard to time, we have been content so far to record cash flows extending up to 5 years prior to floatation day. This line was drawn due to database limitations and, more importantly, out of the authors' belief that older PMC, even though historically interesting, are devoid of potent signaling value. An illustration would entail the longest-tenured (6 years) representatives, i.e. Senators. Given the staggered-terms structure, one third of the Senate seats are up for election every couple of years. Therefore, a donation dating longer than five years may apply to the Senate's oldest third only. But even this minority of Senators would be, by that point, amidst a new electoral campaign requiring fresh funding. This sequence of events underscores a firm's need to fine-tune PMC with the listing project so that a dated PMC record does not turn into a sunk cost. As for firms with no prior donation experience, such a time interval is adequately large for a PMC momentum to evolve and promulgate connectedness even as a work in progress.
This argument could also backfire, rendering our 5-year horizon questionable in favor of a shorter period. To explore this possibility, we stratify PMC IPOs into three subsamples based on floatation day proximity: (i) 119 firms exerting PMC within a period of 6 months or less; (ii) 120 IPOs with PMC older than 6 months and up to a year; and (iii) the remaining 34 IPOs with PMC dating older than one and up to five years.
For each of these groups, we reiterate our main regressions for the effect of PMC on both initial return and filing price revisions. In the interest of brevity, Panel B focuses on the resulting coefficients, γ₁ and γ₂, which convey the gist of our analysis. Evidently, time considerably undermines γ₁ and γ₂ in magnitude and statistical significance across the two specifications. As a consequence, PMC of the 6 most recent months invariably attain the most compelling effects. The strongest evidence in support of the recency argument comes from the return equation; once the 6 months' cutoff has been violated, PMC dating no longer than a calendar year prior to the IPO results in an almost identical effect to PMC that is up to five years old. In parallel, the statistical significance of the coefficients descends the conventional levels, fulfilling, however, the 10% threshold even for the earliest cash flows. The sensitivity to time extends to the revisions equation and coefficient γ₂. The differentiation comes from a high coefficient magnitude for the full 12-month period preceding the IPO, which shrinks nearly by half beyond our second cutoff, while also abolishing the high statistical significance.
Next, we test for the particular cash flow type. So far, we have drawn from the asymmetric information and bookbuilding theories to argue that it is PMC involvement (and level of) that arouses market participants' confidence, assigning a somewhat incidental role to the preferred avenue (i.e. lobbying, PAC and their between combinations). Yet, we have to rule out the possibility that positive externalities of either PMC type flow into, and artificially inflate, the effect of the alternate type. To this end, we split the sample further in order to explicitly account for: i) 61 firms that have employed both PMC methods; ii) 184 firms that have lobbied for but not contributed to PAC; and iii) 28 firms that have contributed to PAC but not lobbying. Panel C disentangles the differential effect of each possible spending manner. As expected, the effect on both initial return and price revisions is highly robust to PMC type with γ₁ and γ₂ significant at the 5% level or higher.
Notably, significance is maximized when 'Both lobby-PAC' is used, for no other sample attains the 1% level in both equations. Therefore, this analysis sheds light on the complementary nature of lobbying and PAC contributions. We conjecture that the personal nature of PAC contributions enables and reinforces more effective lobbying, in the sense that it creates more 'eager ears' for the issues that the company lobbies for. On the other hand, malleable policymakers are of little use in lieu of the strategic communication element entailing a well-implemented lobbying effort. In an optimal setting, investors aspire to anchors in politics with both relevant and current information flowing among them. Accordingly, we identify the anchors in PAC contributions and the information flow in lobbying.
B. Political by Birth & Other Tests
In a subsequent robustness exercise, we revisit the time dimension of PMC from a new perspective.
Specifically, one may argue that time is not only important with regard to listing but also a firm's foundation.
Indeed, our sample includes firms, such as Rex Energy and Molycorp, that commence contributions almost concurrently with their legal formation as corporate entities. This sense of urgency testifies to the existence of a group of political by birth firms that grow their political connections in parallel with the broader asset base and, therefore, appear to have politics deeply ingrained in their corporate culture. Thus, to the extent that the effect of PMC on IPO valuation is conditioned upon the stage of the donor's life cycle, we would expect the relationship to be stronger for political by birth firms and questionable for more mature organizations.
To investigate this proposition, we rerun our main regressions, interacting PMC with an indicator variable for political by birth companies. Allowing for flexibility in the definition of the new factor, we reiterate the analysis by designating political by birth those firms of ages not exceeding: (1) the first quartile value of the full sample (PMC sample) of 4 years (5 years); (2) the median value of the full sample (PMC sample) of 8 years (11 years); and (3) an arbitrarily chosen threshold of 2 years. In all regressions the resulting coefficient on the interaction variable remains insignificant. In simple terms, this shows that an apolitical past, in reference to contributions, will not penalize or weigh adversely upon prospective issuers contemplating to practice PMC at an advanced stage in their corporate life cycle.
We challenge further our findings to address other probable sources of bias. This involves the following variations : (1) replacing the dependent variable of raw initial returns with market-adjusted returns based on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index; (2) measuring underpricing to the end of the 11th trading day identified solely by the nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio. In all tests, the results remain qualitatively similar and, in the interest of brevity, are suppressed. Thus, there is robust evidence in support of the main conclusion of the study: PMC systematically drive downwards first-day returns (and IPO offer price revisions).
VII. Conclusion
In the first study to relate a firm's political donations to IPO valuation, we argue that these cash flows can create value in the going-public process spearheading expectations of access to the upmost decision-making bodies. Indisputably, the ultimate mission of PMC is to foster a firm's perspective on issues pertinent to corporate strategy rather than the IPO event per se. Even so, a traceable and publicly available PMC record is capable of alleviating an important portion of issuer-specific uncertainty while conferring substantial power in pricing negotiations with the lead underwriter. Our empirical evidence lies at the intersection of demand and supply side reasons as: (1) market investors are shown to confide in a connected firm's ability to maneuver with less friction in the institutional environment and (2) the underwriter systematically commences the pricediscovery process from a high starting point as evidenced by a pattern of downward offer price revisions.
Overall, the opportune setting for maintaining first-day returns within range entails substantial implications for prospective issuers; all else being equal, an additional 10% PMC expenditure reduces IPO underpricing by 2.5%. With a median contribution of $ 71.5 thousand for the donor firms in our sample, PMC pose not only as a potent but also as a surprisingly cost-effective strategy.
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, the study shows that a PMC file constitutes a suitable proxy for a firm's 'political connectedness' on the premise that it is both substantial and traceable to specific politicians. To this end, we argue about the twofold nature of an effective PMC strategy as it necessitates lobbying expenditure for size and PAC contributions for identification. In devising the optimal spending pattern, we find that the effect on IPO return is maximized by targeting candidates identifying with the Democratic party and the House of Representatives. At the level of individual characteristics, lengthy tenures of accomplishment and home state candidacies come up as value-adding features. Importantly, the fundamentals of PMC firms show issuers of superior quality as demonstrated by market share, profitability, leverage and years of operational experience. Evidently, PMC firms, rather than seeking a life jacket in politics, are involved in order to manage promptly the legal and institutional environment risks lying ahead. Newly founded issuers or those associated with a long apolitical past are equally entitled to PMC-stemming benefits with veterans in donations, attesting to the appeal of political connections even as a work in progress. With 32 negligible barriers to entry, the ultimate challenge for issuers rests in synchronizing political expenditure with the listing endeavor. In this regard, our sensitivity analysis reveals the urgency for fulfilling a 6-month threshold trailing the IPO so as to constrain first-day return to the maximum extent.
We pave the way for follow-up investigation by offering a glimpse of the PMC-driven sentiment past the IPO event. Tracing the trades of PMC shares deeply into the aftermarket period, we document significantly lower volatility than a matched portfolio of non-PMC IPOs. A limitation of this research pertains to lobbying contributions that, subsequent to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, are available in databases from 1998
onwards.
In conjunction with the overall number of PMC IPOs, a study on the long-term performance and survivorship is likely to encounter sample size as a challenge. However, as more of our identified PMC IPOs age, we anticipate, in the near future, research adding evidence from this alternate horizon. 
First-day return
The difference between the first secondary market closing price available on CRSP and IPO offer price, divided by IPO offer price. This variable is transformed into the regression models by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm.
Revisions
The difference between IPO offer price and midpoint of initial filing price range, divided by IPO offer price.
Absolute revisions
The absolute magnitude of the Revisions variable.
Panel B: Contributions
PMC
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs with lobbying or PAC contributions, else 0.
Political money
The natural logarithm of all lobbying and PAC contributions made in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years.
Lobby money
The natural logarithm of total lobbying dollars in the year most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years.
PAC money
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards candidates in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years.
House money
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards House of Representatives candidates in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years.
Senate money
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards Senate candidates in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years.
Democrat money
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards Democratic candidates in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years.
Republican money
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards Republican candidates in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years.
Both lobby -PAC Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs with both lobby and PAC contributions, else 0.
Just lobby
Dummy variable set to 1for IPOs with lobbying contributions only, else 0.
Just PAC Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs with PAC contributions only, else 0.
Panel C: IPO characteristics
Firm age
The number of years elapsed since firm's foundation to IPO date, using foundation dates from the Field-Ritter database. The variable is transformed into the regressions by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm
Venture capital
Dummy variable set to 1 for venture capital-backed firms, else 0.
Proceeds
Gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as shares offered times the offer price.
Dotcom period
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs within the 1999-2000 period, else 0.
Internet firm
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs of Internet firms, else 0. As Internet firms are classified those with business description sections in Thomson Financial SDC containing any of the words "Internet", "Online", "eBusiness", "eCommerce", and "Website".
Technology firm
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPO firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (i.e. computer hardware); 3661, 3663, 3669 (i.e. communications equipment); 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (i.e. electronics); 3812 (i.e. navigation equipment); 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (i.e Underwriter ranking Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs engaging underwriters of the highest prestige ranking (a value of 9) in the Loughran and Ritter (2004) database, else 0.
Share overhang
The ratio of shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the offering. 
Credit crunch
Market return
The compounded daily return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the 20 trading days trailing the IPO.
Panel D: Firm fundamentals
Assets Assets
The trailing book-value of annual assets in millions of U.S. dollars.
Earnings per share
Dummy variable set to 1 for positive earnings per share in the last fiscal year prior to IPO, else 0.
Leverage
Defined as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the last fiscal year prior to IPO.
Panel E: PMC determinants
Regulated industry
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPO firms with SIC codes of 4900-4939 (electric and gas), 1300 (oil and gas extraction), 4000-4700 (transportation), 4800 (telecommunications), 4950-4959 (sanitary services) and all 6000s (financial companies), else 0.
Pre-IPO mgt ownership
Percentage of total shares held by executive officers & directors prior to IPO, with hand-collected data from the IPO prospectuses.
Bills introduced
The number of bills and joint resolutions introduced in each 2-year Congress.
Electoral College
The electoral college votes corresponding to IPO firm's headquarters state.
Cash flow
The natural logarithm of net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization minus dividends on common and preferred stock. The data comes from the last fiscal year prior to IPO with all amounts in millions of dollars.
Industry PMC
The number of firms in industry (at the 4-digit level of SIC code) with a traceable PMC record. R&D Dummy variable set to1 for IPO firms reporting an R&D figure, else 0.
HHI
The Herfindahl -Hirschman index (HHI) of industry concentration constructed with net revenues from Compustat.
Business segments
The number of firm's business segments as given by the Compustat segment file.
Geographic segments
The number of firm's geographic segments as given by the Compustat segment file.
Media coverage
Dummy variable: 1 for IPOs within the top 25 th percentile of results returned by the LexisNexis database n the year prior to PMC, else 0.
Government purchases
Dummy variable set to1 for the five sectors topping the Economic Census list of U.S. public spending i.e. the sectors of defense, heath, energy, transportation and education, else 0.
Unionized employees
Percentage of industry-wide (at the 4-digit level of SIC code) participation of employees in labour unions as reported in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) . This table reports results of the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of IPO underpricing (dependent variable) on PMC level and other control variables. PMC level is defined as the aggregate U.S. dollar contributions resulting from: any combination of lobbying and PAC (Column 1), lobbying (Column 2), and PAC (Column 3). Our sample consists of U.S. IPOs announced over the period 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013 with an extant record of PMC activity. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The dependent variable and aggregate dollar contributions variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. We use the symbols *, ** and *** to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) Tables 7 and 8 retain their position and are suppressed for simplicity. The dependent variable and aggregate dollar contributions variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix A. We use the symbols *, ** and *** to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively.
Congress chamber Partisan identity Candidate profile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House money -0.0077** This table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum statistics for a sample of 201 PMC IPOs and a matched sample of 201 non-PMC IPOs. A t-test is employed to compare the differences in sample means. The matching is based on the criteria of i) a common 2-digit SIC code ii) proximity in IPO proceeds and iii) a common listing year. The variable analyzed is the 60, 120 and 365 day volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily returns over the aforementioned intervals. All returns are estimated from the 8 th trading day following the IPO and onwards with data from the CRSP database. We use the symbol *** to denote statistical significance at the 1% level. Columns 1 and 2 regress absolute offer price revisions and offer price revisions, respectively, on a PMC dummy and other covariates for a sample of U.S. IPOs (N=1,171) over the period 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. Columns 3 and 4 use IPO first-day returns as the dependent variable for a sample of U.S. IPOs (N=1,578) over the same time period. The unconnected dummy in Column 3 is set to 1 for underwriters which abstain from political contributions in the year that they underwrite a PMC IPO; in Column 4 the unconnected dummy is set to 1 for underwriters that underwrite no more than 1 PMC IPO in any given year. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The estimation procedure used is the generated instrumental variables method. T-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two indicate significance at the 5% level; three indicate significance at the 1% level. This table provides a sensitivity analysis for the effect of PMC time and type on initial return and filing price revisions. We use the generated instrumental variables method and report in Panels A, B, and C the resulting coefficients, γ₁ and γ₂, for the return and revisions equations, respectively, along with the heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors. Panel A gives the resulting coefficients from the full PMC sample (i.e. any PMC combination with a cut-off at 5 years prior to IPO). Panel B limits the time window to produce subsamples of firms engaging in PMC i) within 6 months ii) older than 6 months and up to a year, and iii) older than 1 year and up to 5. Panel C distinguishes by PMC type to produce the subsamples of firms engaging in PMC via i) a combination of lobby and PAC contributions 'Both lobby -PAC' ii) exclusive lobby contributions 'Just lobby', and iii) exclusive PAC contributions 'Just PAC'. In all regressions, the control variables of Tables 7and 8 retain their position and are suppressed for simplicity. The dependent variables in both equations are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0. 
